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The Seven Virtues of Judging: Alvin Rubin's
Civil Rights Opinions
David I. Levine*
I. INTRODUCTION
While planning how to organize some thoughts for this memorial
issue on Judge Rubin's prodigious contributions to the law, and spe-
cifically in the field of civil rights, I recalled once hearing a lecture by
Professor Laurence Tribe, whose work I know Judge Rubin respected.
Speaking at Hastings in 1984, Professor Tribe noted:
We do not just inherit society, we help create it. The choices
that we make as lawyers, as people, do much more than serve
some mix of already existing "interests" and "values." Our
choices shape what our interests and values are by constituting
who and what we ourselves become. To construe and build the
law . .. is to choose the kinds of people, the kind of society,
that we will be.'
In that lecture, Professor Tribe went on to criticize the Supreme
Court of the United States for making the wrong choices. In his view,
the Supreme Court had taken on "a managerial vision of deference to
authority and expertise ... reinforced by the illusory precision and
pretended neutrality of a pseudo-scientific calculus for measuring claims
and counterclaims. " 2 Professor Tribe demonstrated his thesis by pointing
out "seven deadly sins" that he saw as characteristic of this "profound
perversion . . . of the perspective from which any constitutional court
ought to view and help shape the political and social world." 3 Since
the time Professor Tribe delivered this lecture, the Supreme Court has
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I. Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 Hastings L.J. 155, 156 (1984) (emphasis in original).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 171. Professor Tribe identified the sins he saw as: devaluing process,
ignoring the distribution of power and wealth, becoming fixated on the tangible, inviting
the tyranny of small decisions, overlooking the constitutive dimension, abdicating re-
sponsibility for choice, and indulging in judicial imperialism.
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not changed course. If anything, especially with the recent changes in
personnel, the speed has accelerated.4
I thought it would be useful to revisit the themes of that lecture
here because by implication Professor Tribe also presented a positive
vision of the judicial role in our society. For this article, I have made
that positive vision explicit by transforming Professor Tribe's list of sins
into the Seven Virtues of Judging. I suspect that I will not shock any
gentle readers if I reveal that when Judge Rubin's civil rights opinions
are measured against that vision, we see an example nonpareil of what
judges should be doing to help us choose the kinds of people, the kind
of society, we will be.
II. THE SEVEN VIRTUES OF JUDGnG
A. Valuing Process
Professor Tribe criticized the Supreme Court for devaluing process-
for "talking about values like those of procedural fairness as though
they were simply tools, instruments, means to the end of maximizing
the size of the total pie for society rather than things substantively
valued in themselves." ' Professor Tribe illustrated this point by discussing
two then-recent Supreme Court opinions" where the Court stated that
the costs of losing criminal convictions outweighed the benefits of in-
cremental deterrence of police conduct. Professor Tribe criticized the
Court for ignoring the more subtle point-that we should not allow the
courts to be parties to police lawlessness.
Judge Rubin knew that process has value in and of itself. For
example, it happens that the Fifth Circuit led the nation's federal courts
in adopting the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule7 that the
4. For example, in the very week I began to draft this article, the Supreme Court
handed down decisions that were in keeping with the trend Professor Tribe identified.
Both of these decisions were to the political right of what even the Bush Administration
wanted in each case. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992)
(rejecting the Justice Department's interpretation that preclearance was required under
Voting Rights Act where power of elected official was reduced just before newly elected
African-American took office); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992) (reversing
NLRB ruling granting non-employees access to employees for organizing purposes).
5. Tribe, supra note 1, at 157.
6. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
7. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). Judge Rubin
castigated the en banc majority for reaching the issue in a purely hypothetical context.
Speaking for a group of ten judges, he pointed out that all twenty-four members of the
Fifth Circuit agreed that on the facts of the case before it, the evidence in question was
admissible because it was found during a valid search. Therefore, under ordinary principles
of judicial self-restraint, it was completely inappropriate to reach out to create the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 848 (Rubin, J., specially concurring).
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Supreme Court ultimately adopted four years later in Leon. Judge Rubin
wrote a special concurrence in which he pointed out that even when
the Supreme Court first adopted the exclusionary rule, deterrence was
not its only basis. He noted that the Court's 1914 opinion in Weeks
v. United States8 also relied upon "the duty of the courts to support
the Constitution and to refuse to sanction practices destructive of rights
secured by it." 9
There are other examples of Judge Rubin's acute awareness of the
evils of devaluing process. Let us briefly examine a minor example and
then another major one. In McDaniel v. Temple Independent School
District,'0 an African-American woman sued her employer for employ-
ment discrimination and retaliatory discharge. The primary issue on
appeal was quite pedestrian-whether or not the district court's findings
of fact in the defendant's favor were clearly erroneous. Except for one
matter, this would be a completely run of the mine case; normally, I
assume Judge Rubin would have agreed with the majority's fully con-
sidered view that the findings could not be disturbed under Rule 52 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." However, what makes this case
a bit unusual is that on the morning of the bench trial, the plaintiff's
lawyer informed the district judge in chambers (without the client present)
that she desired to withdraw from the case because the plaintiff "kept
changing her testimony, that plaintiff's mental condition was deterio-
8. 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914).
9. Williams, 622 F.2d at 849 (Rubin, J., specially concurring). Thus, Judge Rubin
noted that the Weeks Court had said:
The effect of the fourth amendment is to put the courts of the United States
and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under lim-
itations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to
forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law .... The tendency
of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by
means of unlawful seizures ... should find no sanction in the judgments of
the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution,
and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance
of such fundamental rights.
... This protection is equally extended to the action of the government and
officers of the law acting under it .... To sanction such proceedings would be
to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of
the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people
against such unauthorized action.
Id. at 850 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92, 394, 34 S. Ct. 341,
344-45 (1914)).
10. 770 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1985).
11. Indeed, the case was so weak, the district court rendered judgment upon the
defendant's motion for an involuntary dismissal after the close of the plaintiff's case in
chief. Id. at 1346. Judge Rubin did not suggest this ruling was per se improper.
1992]
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rating, and that the plaintiff was acting very aggressively. '"'2 In open
court, the judge informed the plaintiff that her counsel wanted to
withdraw, but did not disclose the details of the in-chambers conver-
sation. The plaintiff replied that she nevertheless wanted the attorney
to represent her. Although the panel majority agreed that the trial court
should have disclosed the nature of the discussion to the plaintiff, it
affirmed the judgment because it concluded that this mistake was harm-
less error.
Needless to say, Judge Rubin saw it differently. He thought the
plaintiff had been prejudiced. The plaintiff's entire case turned on her
credibility, which her own lawyer had destroyed in a private meeting
with the sole trier of fact. Even if there was no actual prejudice to
what was evidently a rather weak case for the plaintiff, Judge Rubin
felt that the very appearance of prejudice warranted a new trial. In
concluding, he noted:
Judicial case management, avoidance of delay, and denial of
unjustified continuances are all commendable. They are, how-
ever, only means to an end. That end is justice; justice done
and perceived to be done. [Ilt is not only [the plaintiff) who
suffers from what was done here. The splendor of justice is
tarnished."a
In other words, process matters, even at the cost of a new trial where
the outcome will probably not change.
For a final example, let us look at a case with far greater significance
than the unusual circumstances of McDaniel, a case in which Judge
Rubin's views ultimately prevailed. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co.,14 Judge Rubin wrote the decision for the panel, holding that in
civil cases, attorneys could not use peremptory challenges to strike
African-Americans from a jury. The Fifth Circuit, en banc, reversed,' 5
holding that Batson v. Kentucky 6 was limited to criminal cases only.
Judge Rubin dissented, contending that there was sufficient state action
in the use of peremptory challenges in civil cases to warrant application
of the Batson rule. Even if this would result in a more cumbersome
procedure for civil cases, in Judge Rubin's eyes, it was worth the price.
Otherwise, "[b]y carrying out his duties in a way that permits peremptory
challenges based on race, the . . . judge's approval of discrimination
rubs off onto society, corroding the national character by giving private
12. McDaniel, 770 F.2d at 1350 (majority opinion).
13. Id. at 1353 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
14. 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988).
15. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
16. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
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prejudice the imprimatur of state approval."'' 7 I am happy to report
that this view ultimately prevailed when the Supreme Court reversed the
en banc decision.'8 Apparently, Judge Rubin's position on the state
action issue and his commentary on how the appearance that judges
condone such racial discrimination would affect society helped sway a
six-member majority to vote his way in the Supreme Court. 9
Thus, in cases large and small, Judge Rubin understood that process
has its own value, which a slavish adherence to cost-benefit analysis
can mask. He undoubtedly would have agreed with Professor Tribe that
judges can become "accomplices in illegality"2 0 if they allow process to
be devalued.
B. Heeding the Effects of the Distribution of Power and Wealth
Professor Tribe next noted that the Supreme Court frequently ig-
nored the distribution of power and wealth in making decisions con-
cerning regulatory burdens placed upon the exercise of constitutional
rights. He believed that members of the Court were much too accepting
of the Chicago School of Economics' world view, "where the inability
to pay is a meaningless concept.''2 According to Professor Tribe, Chi-
cago School adherents make the assumption that someone who has not
"bought" X (in this case a constitutional right) just does not value X
enough to give up other things in order to purchase it.22 In this portion
of his lecture, Professor Tribe awarded the "Anatole France Award"
17. Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 233 (Rubin, J., dissenting). Later in his dissent, Judge
Rubin stated: "Racial prejudice has no more place in the federal courtroom on the days
the court is conducting a civil trial than it does on the days when the same judge, seated
at the same bench, in the same courtroom, before the same American flag, is conducting
a criminal trial." Id. at 236.
18. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., IIl S. Ct. 2077 (1991). Cost-benefit analysis
was not put aside for the day, however. For example, in his majority opinion Justice
Kennedy noted that "if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as
fair, the price is too high to meet the standard of the Constitution." Id. at 2088. In
dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out that there were other costs to the Court's ruling-for
example, making jury trials even more complex than they are already. Id. at 2095-96
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, to some degree, the differences between the members of
the Court just amounted to placing different values on the comparative costs and benefits
of the competing rules; no one took the occasion to question the cost-benefit school of
jurisprudence.
19. Justice Kennedy even took the trouble to write Judge Rubin a letter of appreciation
for his powerful dissent in Edmonson, which helped Justice Kennedy see the need for a
"morally persuasive voice that gives law its legitimacy and moral foundation." Tony
Mauro, Revelations off The Bench, The Recorder (S.F.), Sept. 15, 1992, at 8. Unfor-
tunately, Judge Rubin died before the letter arrived in his chambers. Id.
20. Tribe, supra note 1, at 158.
21. Id. at 159.
22. Id.
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to a case in which the Court held that denying financial aid to both
poor and wealthy college students constituted equal treatment.
23
Where did Judge Rubin stand on this issue? Some opinions provide
fairly strong hints that Judge Rubin did not care for the Chicago School
approach to constitutional rights. For example, in Ruiz v. Estelle,14 he
said:
Constitutional rights are not, of course, confined to those
available at moderate costs. The very concept of federalism...
and the nature of the safeguards imposed by the Bill of Rights
and the fourteenth amendment levy costs impossible for the
accountant to calculate, but esteemed by us because they are
literally priceless.
2s
Perhaps the best example of Judge Rubin's views are contained in
his opinion for a three-judge panel in Islamic Center of Mississippi,
Inc. v. City of Starkville.26 In Islamic Center, an association of Muslim
students attending Mississippi State University applied for permission to
use a building near the campus as a mosque. The City of Starkville
denied the application, citing its zoning ordinances and concerns for
parking and traffic safety. The Center sued, contending that the City's
denial of its application violated the civil rights of its members under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. After a bench
trial, the district court found for the City. The district court noted that
the City's ordinances neither "infringe[d] upon an individual's right or
ability to turn toward Mecca and pray at the specified times during
each day," nor did they "preclude students from purchasing cars and
driving to a worship site located in [another zoning] district or walking
to a site located . . .outside the Starkville city limits." 27
To Judge Rubin, these findings also deserved a nomination for the
coveted award:
The suggestion is reminiscent of Anatole France's comment
on the majestic equality of the law that forbids all men, the
23. Id. at 160-61 (citing Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research
Group, 468 U.S. 841, 104 S. Ct. 3348 (1984)) (upholding regulations that withheld federal
financial aid from students who did not certify they had registered for the military draft).
24. 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S. Ct. 1438
(1983).
25. Id. at 1146. Judge Rubin went on to note immediately after this quotation that
remedies imposing great cost on a state (here involving the administration of the entire
Texas prison system) should not be ordered unless the constitutional need had been
demonstrated. Id.
26. 840 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1988). This was the first federal appellate decision to find
any municipal zoning in violation of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.
See Richard J. Roddewig, Recent Developments in Land Use, Planning and Zoning, 21
Urb. Law. 769, 808 (1989).
27. Id. at 298.
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rich as well as the poor, to sleep under bridges, to beg in the
streets, and to steal bread. Laws that make churches, synagogues,
and mosques accessible only to those affluent enough to travel
by private automobile obviously burden the exercise of religion
by the poor, a class that includes many students. And a city
may not escape the constitutional protection afforded against its
actions by protesting that those who seek an activity it forbids
may find it elsewhere. By making a mosque relatively inaccessible
within the city limits to Muslims who lack automobile trans-
portation, the City burdens their exercise of their religion."
I do not think that anyone would accuse Judge Rubin of ignoring the
fact that there are times when facially neutral regulations can have a
discriminatory impact on the exercise of constitutional rights by the
poor.
C. Avoiding Fixation on the Tangible
In a portion of his lecture, Professor Tribe called attention to the
fact that the Supreme Court's approach led to "a fixation on the
tangible, visible impacts of challenged governmental practices, to the
exclusion of such relative intangibles as the comparative status or dignity
of distinct groups in society."2 9 He illustrated his point by reviewing
two then-recent Establishment Clause cases, Lynch v. Donnelly0 and
Marsh v. Chambers.3 In Lynch, the Supreme Court sanctioned the
official placement at public expense of a creche in a prominent place
at Christmas-time without including in the display any reminders of the
holy symbols of other religions.3 2 In Marsh, the Court condoned a state
legislature having a chaplain begin every legislative day with a prayer.
Professor Tribe's point was that such decisions allowed members of the
establishment to send a message to others that they were not full members
of the political community.3
We can understand Judge Rubin's perspective on this by looking
further at Islamic Center. Judge Rubin responded as follows to the
district judge's argument that the City had not infringed on the students'
28. Id. at 298-99.
29. Tribe, supra note 1, at 161.
30. 465 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
31. 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
32. The display was described as one typical for Christmas-time: besides the "tra-
ditional" creche scene depicting the birth of Jesus Christ, included were Santa Claus'
house, carolers, a Christmas tree, colored lights, a sign saying "Season's Greetings" and
perhaps more unusually, cutout figures of a clown, a teddy bear, and an elephant. Lynch,
465 U.S. at 671, 104 S. Ct. at 1358.
33. Tribe, supra note 1, at 161-62.
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free exercise of religion because they could always pray on their own:
The assembly of a community of believers is an integral part
of most religious faiths, certainly of the Muslim. The assembly
of those bound by common beliefs and observances not only
serves to create a sense of community among the members
through the shared expression of their beliefs, it also commu-
nicates to outsiders the church's identity as a group devoted to
a common ideal. By group worship, each worshipper commu-
nicates to outsiders the identity of the group and his own identity
as a member of it, a form of self-expression. Ritual preserves,
evidences, and perpetuates faith. If government exercises its
power to affect group worship, it must demonstrate at least that
the burden imposed serves an important government purpose
and also that this purpose could not be accompanied by a means
less burdensome to the exercise of religion.
34
Although Professor Tribe never makes the point in quite this fashion,
I think that he was referring to the fact that an all-Christian Supreme
Court saw nothing wrong with condoning the Christian (i.e., the religious
establishment) practices that were at issue in Marsh and Lynch.35 As
members of that establishment, the Court found it difficult to truly
appreciate how these symbols would be interpreted by people who were
not. In contrast, what I see resonating in Islamic Center are the ex-
periences of Judge Rubin, who spent virtually his entire life as a Jew
in overwhelmingly Christian areas of Louisiana. Surely this gave him
the perspective to fully appreciate the plight of the Muslim students
who were living in a small city in neighboring Mississippi, which had
over two dozen places of Christian worship but just could not make
34. Islamic Center of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 300 (5th Cir.
1988). At a later point in the opinion, he added:
While lines must be drawn at some point, and, when traffic is congested, a
few more cars may aggravate a bad situation, just as a final straw may break
a camel's back, the City has advanced no rational basis other than neighborhood
opposition to show why the exception granted all other religious centers was
denied the Islamic Center. As the Supreme Court observed in City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, [473 U.S. 432, 447-49, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3259 (1985))
an equal protection case, neighbors' negative attitudes or fears, unsubstantiated
by factors properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not a permissible
basis for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from other group
or multi-unit housing institutions. There is even less justification for differen-
tiating between familiar and unfamiliar religions.
Id. at 302.
35. The closest Professor Tribe came is when he observed: "When the government
dons a cloak of religious sanctity and points to its opponents to suggest that they are
unreligious, the cloak is least likely to be visible, much less objectionable, to those who
wear the same colors." Tribe, supra note 1, at 162.
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room for a tiny group practicing another faith. As an active member
of Jewi!;h institutions wherever he lived in Louisiana, Judge Rubin knew
well the: messages that such establishments send to members of the
religiou!' group, as well as to the community at large, about the identity
of the group. Probably more than most federal judges, he understood
that under the cover of neutral governmental purposes, insiders could
easily send a message to outsiders that they were not full members of
the corr munity.3 6
D. Avoiding the Tyranny of Small Decisions
Pro 'essor Tribe used his fourth sin-inviting the tyranny of small
decision ;-to describe those who would "look down at their feet t6
figure out how far they've gone and where they're heading.""7 As an
example of this sin, Professor Tribe pointed again to Lynch, which he
thought the Court had analyzed as being only marginally different from
Marsh, and therefore just one more acceptably small step down the
road. Professor Tribe used this and other examples to demonstrate that
a series of small decisions could lead to tyranny when the Court failed
to periodically take stock of how these decisions affected "what sort
of socie:y we are and what sort ... we would like to become.""
Within the confined universe of his civil rights opinions, I could
not fine a perfect exemplar of Judge Rubin's expressly avoiding the
tyranny of small decisions. However, at least two opinions from this
group indicate that Judge Rubin knew to look up and see where he
was heading. First, in Patsy v. Florida International University,39 Judge
Rubin dissented from an en banc decision holding that claimants under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 were required to resort to the exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies before entering federal court.4 Judge Rubin noted
that the majority looked for hints and emanations from Supreme Court
opinions that the rule could be changed. In his view, however, the small
steps thg.t some members of the Supreme Court may have made should
36. Ste also Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 277
(1991). In Munn, the plaintiffs, who were African-American Jehovah's Witnesses, charged
that the trial court improperly allowed the defendant to question one of the plaintiffs
about pra tices of Jehovah's Witnesses that were unrelated to the case, which was an
action for wrongful death. The Fifth Circuit held that this was harmless error. Judge
Rubin, dis;enting, stated, "I ... see no way that a reviewing court could be 'sure'-
other than by substituting its own views for those of the jury or by inventing some post-
hoc rationalization for the verdict- that [defendant's] appeal to the jury's religious
prejudice ind nationalism 'had but slight effect' on the verdict." Id. at 583.
37. Tribe, supra note 1, at 162.
38. Id. at 165.
39. 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), reversed sub nom. Patsy v. Board of
Regents, 4;7 U.S. 496, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
40. Pctsy, 634 F.2d at 914 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
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not have tempted the Fifth Circuit to take another, which would alter
a congressionally-made policy judgment. He did not think it appropriate
for the circuit court to second guess the legislative judgment that federal
courts were "likely to provide a civil rights plaintiff with the swiftest,
least costly, and most reliable remedy, and that the litigant should have
access to these portals without first passing through state administrative
antechambers. '" 4' The Supreme Court unanimously agreed with Judge
Rubin that in following small steps to a new rule, the en banc majority
had left behind the salutary congressionally-sanctioned purposes of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.42
In a second example, Judge Rubin refused to be led by a defendant
in step-wise fashion to a conclusion at odds with congressional policy.
In Gary W. v. Louisiana,43 'the state defendants sought relief from Judge
Rubin's award of substantial attorney's fees to the plaintiffs, who had
successfully represented a class of retarded Louisiana children, obtaining
sweeping institutional relief for the class. Judge Rubin rejected the
defendants' contentions that the attorney's fee award was not enforceable
under Rules 69 or 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He
rejected the defendants' "delicately wrought chain of apparent logic"
because it "would have the court read the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in such a fashion as to permit Louisiana or any other state to
ignore a federal judgment against it."" He clearly saw that the step-
by-step process the state defendants urged would avoid implementation
of a congressional mandate to strengthen the protection of individual
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Judge
Rubin did not accept the invitation to look at his feet. He watched
where he was headed.
E. Incorporating the Constitutive Dimension of Governmental Action
The fifth sin-overlooking the constitutive dimension of govern-
mental action-refers to the perspective of thinking about challenged
actions only in terms of demonstrable effects on the world to the
exclusion of what those decisions "say about who and what we are as
a people and how they help to constitute us as a nation. '45 In Professor
Tribe's view, one reason the cost/benefit approach is inappropriate to
judging is that there is no set schedule of values to consult. Constitutional
decisions themselves set and alter the scale of society's values. "When
41. Id. at 916 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
42. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
43. 441 F. Supp. 1121 (E.D. La. 1977), aff'd, 622 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 994, 101 S. Ct. 1695 (1981).
44. Id. at 1125.
45. Tribe, supra note 1, at 165 (emphasis in original).
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constitutional decisions are made, those decisions make a statement to
the country about what counts as a cost and what counts as a benefit,
about what we regard as a good and what we regard as an evil.""6
Professor Tribe illustrated his thesis with a discussion of the criticisms
of the exclusionary rule and the efficacy of alternative means of deterring
illegal police conduct. However, for Professor Tribe, the "real issue"
is "[d]o we want openly and visibly to pay the price for our fourth
amendment ... [o]r do we want to push it under the rug?" '4 If we
"push it under the rug," what does that say about what kind of society
we are?
To illustrate the virtue of incorporating the constitutive dimension
into judging, I think the best examples come from Judge Rubin's op-
inions and actions in the sub-category of civil rights cases known as
institutional reform litigation." For it is here that it is particularly easy
to see Judge Rubin's awareness of the constitutive dimension of gov-
ernmental actions. Four cases deserve special attention: Holland v.
Donelon,4 9 Gary W. v. Louisiana,o Jones v. Diamond,"1 and Ruiz v.
Estelle.5 2
Holland v. Donelon," brought on behalf of prisoners confined in
the Jefferson Parish, Louisiana jail, was a fairly early example of a
46. Id. at 166.
47. Id. at 167. Without going into unnecessary detail here, Professor Tribe developed
the thesis that in the exclusionary rule cases, the Court was implicitly saying that members
of our society preferred to be deceived about the true cost of enforcement of constitutional
protections instead of confronting the choices openly and deciding whether to pay the
price.
48. Institutional reform litigation attempts to invoke the equitable powers of the court
to achieve broad-scale reform of public institutions such as prisons, public schools, and
mental hospitals. See generally sources cited in David Schoenbrod et al., Remedies: Public
and Private (chaps. I & 4) (1990).
49. No. 71-1442 (E.D. La. May 16, 1972) (unreported decision); 2 Prison L. Rep.
375 (E.D. La. June 6, 1973) (edited text of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order by Rubin, J.); 3 Prison L. Rep. 288 (E.D. La. June 26, 1974) (edited text of
opinion by Rubin, J.). Holland concerned conditions in the jail run by Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana, a suburban area adjacent to New Orleans. Although Judge Rubin did not
publish any opinions in connection with this action in Federal Supplement, the standard
reporter, it was the subject of a case study in M. Kay Harris and Dudley P. Spiller, Jr.,
After Decision: Implementation of Judicial Decrees in Correctional Settings (1977) [here-
inafter M. Harris and D. Spiller].
50. 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976). Gary W. challenged the adequacy of treatment
programs in out-of-state institutions for mentally retarded, physically handicapped, and
delinquent children from Louisiana.
51. 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 27(1981). The focus of Jones was the conditions in the jail run by Jackson County,
Mississippi.
52. 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S. Ct. 1438(1983). Ruiz was a class action filed on behalf of the over 33,000 inmates confined in
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suit challenging conditions in and practices of a local jail. When assigned
the case, Judge Rubin found an overcrowded jail with intolerable con-
ditions. He found that hardened criminals were often put in cells with
youthful first offenders or those merely charged with crimes. Mentally
disturbed prisoners were held in that same facility as well. Some cells
contained over twenty people, with inadequate floor and sleeping space,
while some prisoners had to sleep with neither mattresses nor blankets.
Several of the jail practices fostered racial discrimination and segrega-
tion . 4 A later opinion focused on inadequacies in health, medical,
sanitation, and exercise facilities in the jail.55
In their case study of the implementation of Holland, Harris and
Spiller reported that Judge Rubin achieved reform despite the difficult
context within which he had to work. They noted that he faced public
apathy toward the parish jail and prisoners in general, defendants who
were unfriendly to the lawsuit, a fragmented local government structure
with uncertain lines of responsibility, and tremendous personal rancor
between the parties.56
The case study of Judge Rubin's work provides a textbook example
of how, despite such formidable problems, federal judges can use the
tools available to achieve meaningful institutional reform. Early on, he
appointed a special master to assist in shaping the relief and in mon-
itoring compliance.17 He selected someone whom the sheriff had rec-
ommended to serve as the special master.5" As was appropriate, Judge
Rubin involved the defendants in shaping the order that would apply
to them.5 9 He was careful to make clear that he was relying on the
recommendations of the person the sheriff had wanted or upon the
specific command of federal or Louisiana law. 60 The relief ordered was
institutions operated by the Texas Department of Corrections. It was "the most com-
prehensive civil action suit in correctional law history." Ben M. Crouch and James W.
Marguart, An Appeal to Justice: Litigated Reform of Texas Prisons 2 (1989).
53. No. 71-1442 (E.D. La. May 16, 1972) (unreported decision); 2 Prison L. Rep.
375 (E.D. La. June 6, 1973) (edited text of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order by Rubin, J.); 3 Prison L. Rep. 288 (E.D. La. June 26, 1974) (edited text of
opinion by Rubin, J.).
54. M. Harris and D. Spiller, supra note 49, at 148-49.
55. Id. at 152, discussing Holland v. Donelon, 2 Prison L. Rep. 375 (E.D. La. 1973).
56. Id. at 179-80.
57. Id. at 187; Holland v. Donelon, 2 Prison L. Rep. 375 (E.D. La. 1973). See
generally David I. Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Special Masters
in Federal Institutional Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 753 (1984).
58. Holland v. Donelon, 2 Prison L. Rep. 375 (E.D. La. 1973).
59. M. Harris and D. Spiller, supra note 49, at 187. Harris and Spiller note that
involving the defendants in shaping the relief was helpful but was not "a guarantee of
ease in attaining compliance." Id. at 188.
60. Id. at 187.
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specific about the ends that the defendants had to achieve, rather than
the means, and was narrowly focused on the deficiencies identified in
the course of the suit.6'
In order to achieve actual compliance with his orders, Judge Rubin
relied on a number of enforcement tools. In addition to relying on the
plaintiffs and their attorneys to serve as compliance monitors, 62 he used
the special master, who was also a United States Magistrate, for this
function. The master's frequent and unannounced visits to the jail were
an important stimulus for compliance. 63 The judge also required com-
pliance reports and set deadlines for action, which the plaintiffs could
use as the basis for filing motions for additional relief.64 An escalating
series of responses and sanctions were used to ensure compliance. 6s
As reported by Harris and Spiller, the Holland suit led directly to
substantial change in the conditions in the Jefferson Parish jail. Basic
conditions and treatment of prisoners improved. For example, a max-
61. Id. at 186-88. Harris and Spiller discuss in some detail the importance of this
type of specificity:
The relief granted reflected [Judge Rubin's] philosophy about the proper role
of courts. The judge reported that he was not a great believer in government
by judges and that he would prefer the courts have a lesser degree of respon-
sibility for social change .... Such views undoubtedly contributed to the form
that the relief took in Holland .... Given defendants who were not known for
their receptivity to outside intervention, specificity may have been necessary for
obtaining compliance .... The relief in Holland was clear and unambiguous.
This proved to be helpful in holding defendants to their responsibilities....
Most of the obligations imposed were of a nature that a simple assessment
could be made of whether or not they had been, or were being fulfilled....
The nature of the orders ... did contribute to a belief that the judge was
committed to achievement of compliance and to standards for measuring it. In
the long run, this approach paid off in substantial compliance with the letter
of the orders.
Id. at 189.
62. Id. at 190-92.
63. Id. at 192-95. The jail staff complied with the special master's "requests" because
of the fear that he was acting "en loco Rubin." Id. at 194. The master wielded great
influence as a result of the judge's tacit support combined with his "inspector general"
style of demanding full compliance with the judge's orders and the credibility he enjoyed
with the defendants due to the fact that "he did not appear to be a bleeding heart"
(Judge Rubin's words). Id. at 194-95.
64. Id. at 195-97.
65. For example, the judge started with an informal Saturday morning meeting with
the entire parish council to make clear that he expected that there would be compliance
with his order and that they could be held responsible for any failures. Id. at 197-98.
Later, he used warnings, rebukes and finally an award of attorney's fees as a sanction
for failure to comply with the orders. Holland v. Donelon, 3 Prison L. Rep. 288, 291
(E.D. La. 1974) (awarding fees as sanction). As one of the defense attorneys told Harris
and Spiller, "you don't mess around with Judge Rubin's orders." M. Harris and D.
Spiller, supra note 49, at 201.
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imum limit on the jail population substantially improved prisoner safety
and comfort. Sanitation and medical care were enhanced.66 There were
indirect benefits as well. A release-on-recognizance program was revised
to increase the number of eligible arrestees. Parish trial judges expedited
trials to reduce jail time. The district attorney's office implemented a
program that allowed assistant district attorneys to handle minor cases
without requiring defendants to be jailed as part of the standard booking
process. The lawsuit enhanced the visibility of the jail, making parish
officials more aware of their responsibilities toward the jail. The parish
council made more money available for the jail, and the voters passed
a bond issue to build a new jail, which had been rejected in the past.67
All parties concerned agreed that Judge Rubin's determined efforts led
to an improved quality of life for the prisoners and a new level of
concern for the parish jail among citizens and parish officials.6
The constitutive element of the Holland case is fairly obvious. Al-
though the Harris and Spiller report does not go into detail on this
matter, Judge Rubin was requiring Jefferson Parish to live up to its
obligations to treat its prisoners in constitutionally minimal ways at a
time when this was a fairly new concept. 69 To have backed down at
any stage of this case, which was a fairly early example of federal
intervention into the traditionally local and sacrosanct function of jail
administration, would have been a signal that the courts were not serious
about enforcing compliance with their orders. Implicitly, the judge's
message to the citizens of the parish was that they must be willing to
pay the costs of having a jail run according to minimum federal and
state standards. Judge Rubin was saying that our society treats everyone,
even prisoners, with minimum human decency.
Gary W. v. Louisiana7 ° is a more well-known case where Judge
Rubin made clear that the constitutive element was important to his
66. M. Harris and D. Spiller, supra note 49, at 204.
67. Id. at 204-09. The authors point out that some of the people they interviewed
for their report noted that the suit indirectly had certain negative impacts as well. (There
were no negative effects reported as being a direct result of any of Judge Rubin's orders.)
Desegregation may have led to more prisoner-on-prisoner violence. Prisoners who were
transferred to other facilities in order to keep the jail within the maximum population
limits may have been sent to facilities that were even worse. Judges may have become
reluctant to sentence appropriately for fear of overcrowding the jail. Jail personnel resented
the implication that they were uncaring and were personally responsible for the deplorable
conditions in the facility. Id. at 209-11.
68. Id. at 212-13. Of course, this constitutional minimum did not turn the jail into
Shangri-la. As one plaintiff's attorney said, "It's still pretty rotten in there." Id. at 211.
69. E.g., see id. at 4 (describing previous attitude of federal courts as viewing prisoners
as slaves of the state) and 179 (at time Holland was filed, there was little public under-
standing of the legal precedents being developed on the rights of prison inmates).
70. 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).
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decision-making as a district judge. Gary W. represented a class of
plaintiffs comprised of children from Louisiana who had been placed
in institutions" located in Texas (due to the lack of sufficient facilities
in Louisiana) either at the direction of the State of Louisiana or with
its financial support. 72 The plaintiffs sought their return to Louisiana
and the treatment due them under federal law. 71
Because of their severe and chronic conditions, for many of these
children, in some sense, it was an act of mercy for them (and for their
families) to be given state-sponsored custodial care. Judge Rubin noted
that, nevertheless, the state could not offer institutional confinement
unless it considered means "capable of achieving its purposes in ways
that are least stifling to personal liberty, and it must offer a therapeutic
consideration, 'a quid pro quo, for the deprivation. 11 4 As in Holland,
Judge Rubin wrote an order that tried to achieve several goals at once.
While affording significant relief to the aggrieved children was the
primary goal, Judge Rubin was careful not to impose more upon the
state defendants than he felt the Constitution required. He also wanted
to create a manageable decree. 7
71. The children were institutionalized for a variety of reasons: some were abandoned
by their parents, some were delinquent, others were emotionally disturbed, mentally
retarded and/or physically handicapped. Id. at 1213.
72. At the time the plaintiffs brought the case, there was really only one other like
it in the country. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced 344
F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974). See Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering
Institutional Change, 84 Yale L.J. 1338 (1975). Gary W. was even more complex than
Wyatt because the latter dealt with only one kind of person, mentally retarded adults.
"The individual variations within that group [in Wyatt] may be great but they do not
approach the differences in the various children who comprise the plaintiff class." Gary
W., 437 F. Supp. at 1219.
73. Gary W., 437 F. Supp. at 1213.
74. Id. at 1217. However, Judge Rubin noted that under the Constitution, he could
only impose a floor. "[T]he constitutional right to some quid pro quo does not imply a
right to the best treatment available, any more than the right to counsel means the right
to the nation's foremost trial lawyer .... The quid pro quo the state must provide is
treatment based on expert advice reasonably designed to affect [sic] the purposes of state
action." Id. at 1217-18 (emphasis in original).
In a later section of the opinion, Judge Rubin took care to demonstrate that his
order fit within the Supreme Court's opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975), which had pointedly neither endorsed nor rejected the quid pro
quo thesis. "After full restudy of O'Connor . . . I have concluded that the requirements
imposed on the State are exacted by the constitutional rights of the plaintiff children,
even if .. . the confinement of the . . . children . . . is based on the State's historic role
as parens patriae." Gary W., 437 F. Supp. at 1222.
75. In general, the Court has tried to avoid ordering the parties to comply
with an order that would have the infinite detail of a set of engineering
specifications. It has attempted to write guidelines that would prevent child
19921 1513
4LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Despite his concern for not overstepping his constitutional authority
and intruding unnecessarily into the state's affairs, Judge Rubin un-
derstood that in Gary W. he was making a statement about society's
priorities:
No compassionate human being could fail to be moved by the
plight of the children who are plaintiffs. Nor can that tragedy
be viewed in isolation as the child's alone. For in many instances,
the child's family is wrenched by the calamity. There is inter-
action between family and child, child and family, so intricately
entwined that the family's disorder heightens the child's, and
the child's plight rends the family. Unable to care for the child,
parents are willing, sometimes eager, to have the child placed
elsewhere if only to obtain the adequate custodial care that they
can no longer manage to provide.
7 6
In an echo of Professor Tribe's rejection of pushing problems "under
the rug," Judge Rubin noted that it had long been thought improper
to hide away deformed or inferior children. 7 Gary W. clearly says that
abuse and assure good treatment for children without writing an order that
would require infinite precautions against spectral perils and without enmeshing
treatment personnel in a bureaucracy. The children affected by this order will
each have treatment plans; they will each be in a therapeutic institution; the
institution and the child's plan will be subject to periodic review.
Gary W., 437 F. Supp. at 1223.
The order rejected two of the plaintiffs' main aims: (a) A ruling that the "least
restrictive alternative" standard be interpreted to mean "the kind of treatment that is
both nearest the home and imposes the least of all possible restrictions on the child's
freedom." Id. at 1215; and (b) a ruling that the children must be treated in Louisiana.
Id. at 1216. Judge Rubin concluded that although the plaintiffs had presented "what is
presently known concerning the most desirable ways to treat children," id. at 1218, he
could not "incorporate judicial sentiments, however noble" into "inexorable bonds" upon
the state officials charged with caring for the children. Id. at 1219. He also rejected the
contention that the children had to be treated in Louisiana as a matter of federal law.
Although he required that they be returned to Louisiana for preparation of their individual
treatment plans, he adopted the defendants' suggestion that the children be cared for in
"the best available environment," wherever that may be for the individual child. Id. at
1220. Flatly requiring all the children to be treated in Louisiana would lead to "dumping"
them because of the lack of sufficient facilities within the state. Id.
In the order, Judge Rubin, also considered but did not appoint a special master.
Id. at 1225. At a later date, after the case was transferred to another judge when Judge
Rubin was appointed to the Fifth Circuit, a special master was appointed because of the
state's foot-dragging in implementing the ordered relief. See Gary W. v. Louisiana, 601
F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979) (affirming appointment of special master); Murray Levine, The
Role of Special Master in Institutional Reform Litigation: A Case Study, 8 Law & Policy
275, 316-17 nn. 24-25 (1986) (some discussion of work of special master in Gary W.).
76. Gary W., 437 F. Supp. at 1217.
77. "For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law
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as a society we need to forthrightly confront the problems of these
children and their families, and to pay the price the Constitution imposes
for treating these citizens with decency.
Once he was appointed to the Fifth Circuit, Judge Rubin did not
abandon the constitutive element in his decision-making. His appellate
institutional reform opinions show the same concerns he expressed in
Holland and Gary W.
Jones v. Diamond ' was initiated as a class action brought on behalf
of prisoners confined in the jail operated by Jackson County, Mississippi.
The prisoners contended that conditions and practices in the jail violated
their constitutional rights in a number of respects. After the trial court
made findings that were generally favorable to the county officials, the
prisoner-plaintiffs appealed. As with the prior opinions, Judge Rubin
clearly understood that the federal judicial role was to protect the
constitutional rights of the prisoners without unduly interfering with
local management of the prison.7 9 Speaking for the en banc majority,
Judge Rubin found that despite the lower court's findings, there had
been a number of constitutional violations, including segregated facilities,
cruel and unusual punishment due to inadequate and overcrowded fa-
cilities, as well as exposure to violence and disease from other prisoners,
improper treatment of pre-trial detainees, due process violations with
respect to the imposition of discipline, and infringement of First Amend-
ment rights.10 The majority opinion ordered injunctive relief in certain
instances and further proceedings in the district court to resolve other
issues, including fixing the award of attorneys and expert witness fees
to the plaintiffs.
which should provide .. .[that] 'the offspring of the inferior, or of the better
when they chance to be deformed, will be put in some mysterious, unknown
place, as they should be' but such ideas could not be imposed by 'any legislature
... without doing violence to both the letter and spirit of the Constitution."'
Id. (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02, 43 S. Ct. 625, 627 (1923)).
78. 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950, 102 S. Ct. 27
(1981).
79. Judges are neither correctional officers nor penologists. Even if we had
the expertise to analyze the practical and theoretical implications of the conditions
of incarceration, we would have no warrant to impose our views, for a legis-
lature-state or federal-is not required by the Constitution to operate penal
institutions in accordance with criminological doctrine or to employ only experts
in management. ...
... While our "inquiry ... into [state] prison management must be limited
to the issue of whether a particular system violates any prohibition of the
Constitution," it is our duty, when jurisdiction is properly invoked, to protect
prisoners' constitutional rights, for "[tihere is no iron curtain drawn between
the Constitution and the prisoners of this country."
Id. at 1368 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1886 (1979)
and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2974 (1974)).
80. Id. at 1373-75.
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The dissent, signed by ten of the twenty-four judges on the court,
contended that Judge Rubin's opinion for the en banc majority had
stretched the appellate role in three significant ways: (a) The dissent
charged that Judge Rubin had retried the case at the appellate level;8
(b) it contended that the majority ignored the change in conditions
created by the fact that a new jail had been built since the suit had
been filed and that in other significant respects, there was no reason
to believe that there was an "attitude of indifference for the welfare
of prisoners" in Jackson County; 2 and (c) the dissent also contended
that the majority had legislated by awarding expert witness fees despite
congressional silence on the subject. 3.
Let us assume for the moment that in the privacy of his chambers,
or perhaps at a corner table at Mother's Restaurant eating a dressed
po' boy, Judge Rubin would have had to plead guilty as charged.
4
81. In over fifteen years this is the first time, that I can recall, in which
the Court makes its own credibility choices and findings of fact....
The Court is obviously well aware of what it is doing when it repudiates the
findings of the District Court, made on conflicting evidence, after that Court
had seen and heard the witnesses.
Id. at 1387 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1385-86.
83. There is no doubt that Congress could, and may yet, legislate on the
subject of expert witness fees in civil cases, just as it has on the subject of
attorneys fees, but the inescapable fact is that it has not done so. That is
immaterial, I suppose, for the Court now does so.
Id. at 1391.
84. (a) With respect to the charge of appellate fact-finding, Judge Rubin first noted
that the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous in many respects, both in regard to
conditions at the time the suit was commenced and when it was actually tried four years
later. Id. at 1370. He wrote an extensive section labeled "Facts" on the basis of testimony
and defendants' answers to interrogatories which Judge Rubin believed warranted a number
of conclusions about the jail conditions when the suit was commenced. Id. at 1371-73.
The dissent believed that "[wihat we have here is the classical situation of experts and
other witnesses testifying on opposite sides of a case and contradicting one another on
the witness stand." Id. at 1389. Without careful investigation of the record, it is impossible
to predict whether the Supreme Court would have agreed with Judge Rubin that the trial
court's findings were clearly erroneous. E.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 574, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985) ("Where there are two permissible views of
the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.").
(b) Despite the improvements due to the construction of the new jail,
[t]he provision of a new and sanitary building does not assure that it will be
operated in a constitutional way ....
Because nothing in the record provides any comfort to the plaintiff class or
any assurance to this court that the results of the almost seven-year litigation
will not be lost and the wrongs of the past will not be recommitted, we deem
the issuance of an injunction necessary.
Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S.
950, 102 S. Ct. 27 (1981). Although it was hardly clear at the time Jones was written,
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Why would he (along with thirteen other judges) break the normal
bounds of the appellate role in this case? I believe this is a case where
the en banc majority agreed with Judge Rubin's strong desire to see
that constitutional minimums would be maintained even if the price to
be paid was a stretching of the appellate role. Determining that the
trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous is fairly unusual;
without saying so expressly, I think Judge Rubin was concerned about
what would happen if the appellate court did not take a strong hand
in guiding the district court's actions. He clearly lacked confidence in
the defendants' ability to follow the demands of the Constitution; it
seems he also had some doubts about the trial court's ability to do the
same.a" In other words, the constitutive value of the case-the treatment
of prisoners according'to the constitutional minimums-was more im-
portant than some of the traditional niceties of appellate deference.a6
Ruiz v. Estelle87 provides an interesting contrast to Jones. Ruiz,
decided in the year following Jones, was also a class action brought on
certainly under present Supreme Court standards the Fifth Circuit should have remanded
the case to allow the district court to determine whether, with the building of the new
jail, the defendants had met their obligations under the Constitution and therefore could
be released from the jurisdiction of the court. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, Ill S. Ct.
630, 638 (1991). The Jones dissent obliquely suggested the same. Jones, 636 F.2d at 1386.
(c) With respect to awarding expert witness fees, Judge Rubin's rule, which was based
on a reading of general rather than specific congressional intent, did not prevail in the
circuit, but has just enjoyed a resurrection through legislative action. Had the Jones rule
on expert witness fees not been overruled in International Woodworkers v. Champion
Int'l, 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), it would have been rejected later due to
Supreme Court rulings on the issue, which emphasized a strict, plain-meaning interpretation
of the relevant federal statutes. W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, Ill S. Ct. 1138
(1991); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 107 S. Ct. 2494 (1987).
Very recently, Congress changed the rule again, back to Judge Rubin's position, by
providing express authority for the award of expert witness fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, § 113.
85. Without going into the details here, it is fair to say that the district court judge
did not enjoy a reputation for rigorous enforcement of civil rights laws.
86. In the interests of keeping this section of the article to a reasonably manageable
length, I am omitting a full discusslon of another institutional reform case in which Judge
Rubin was accused of doing the same thing. In United States v. Lawrence County School
Dist., 799 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1986), Judge Rubin, writing for himself and Judge Wisdom,
ordered substantial changes in a district court's desegregation order that applied to a rural
Mississippi school district. The dissenting judge went to considerable lengths to support
his belief that Judge Rubin had broken the traditional bonds of appellate judging. E.g.,
id. at 1052 ("the majority's presentation is not supported by the paper record on which
it purports to rely."); id. at 1060 ("An appellate court ought ordinarily to await the trial
court's decision before reversing it."). For my purposes, there is no point in trying to
determine whether the dissenting judge's charges were well founded. Assuming arguendo
that they were, I would speculate that Judge Rubin's motivations were akin to what I
think motivated him in Jones.
87. 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S. Ct. 1438
(1983).
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behalf of prisoners. Rather than challenging the operation of one jail,
however, Ruiz was brought on behalf of the tens of thousands of inmates
confined in the twenty-two institutions operated by the Texas Department
of Corrections (TDC). Like Jones, the suit contended that the conditions
of confinement violated the United States Constitution in a number of
respects.a8 Unlike the prior case, however, where the overriding issue
was whether the trial court had not gone far enough to protect the
class of prisoner-plaintiffs, the major question in Ruiz was whether the
trial court had gone too far in the other direction. 9
With respect to the conduct of the trial and findings of fact, Judge
Rubin's opinion for a unanimous panel gave the trial court substantial
benefit of the doubt and affirmed its factual findings. 90 In turning to
a review of the relief ordered, Judge Rubin was not so indulgent. There
were two reasons for this. First, subsequent to the district court's order,
the Supreme Court had held that double-ceiling prisoners was not un-
constitutional per se. 9' In light of Rhodes, it turned out that "the district
court adopted some remedies that are not essential for the elimination
of unconstitutional prison conditions." 9 Second, Judge Rubin applied
standards equivalent to those he had set for himself in Holland and
Gary W. to measure the relief ordered by the district court in Ruiz.93
88. Id. at 1126.
89. Judge Rubin framed the issue in similar terms to his handling of Holland and
Gary W. as a district court judge:
We are required to determine whether the district court correctly found that
the conditions of confinement in TDC violate the Constitution and, if so, whether
the remedy imposed went beyond the correction of constitutional deficiencies
and intruded unduly on the state's management of its prison system or enmeshed
the court in the details of prison management.
Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1126.
90. For example, Judge Rubin spent a substantial amount of time refuting the defense's
contention that the 'entire record is permeated with favoritism' toward the plaintiffs"
in the conduct of the trial, id. at 1129, and the contention that the district court failed
to make sufficiently specific findings of fact, id. at 1132-33. In contrast to his conclusory
finding in Jones that the trial court had made clearly erroneous findings of fact, in Ruiz,
Judge Rubin meticulously reviewed the findings of fact in the opinion and concluded that
they were not clearly erroneous. Id. at 1140-42.
91. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981), discussed in Ruiz,
679 F.2d at 1137-40.
92. Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1145.
93. It appears desirable, therefore, first to undertake measures that will not
be both costly and irreversible. If these measures do not work, then additional
ones may be necessary. This "wait and see" approach ensures that the intrusion
into state processes will be no greater than that required to achieve compliance
with the Constitution.
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He meticulously reviewed the provisions of the decree under these stan-
dards, affirming many of the provisions 94 and trimming others.
95
After his careful review of a very complex order, Judge Rubin
concluded his opinion by reminding the parties of the constitutive di-
mension of what they were all doing:
The Federal Constitution is a charter for all officials, federal
and state. All those who wield the power of the sovereign must
be equally obedient to its commands and faithful in ensuring
its protections. They take the same oath we do-to uphold and
defend it.
* The implementation of the district court's decree can
become a ceaseless guerilla war, with endless hearings, opinions
and appeals, and incalculable costs. But it is instead to be hoped
that, if the state adopts the policy that inmates must be accorded
their constitutional rights and that prison officials will not be
permitted to indulge in petty practices designed to deny those
rights, the period of judicial supervision can more speedily be
concluded.... [C]onstitutional peace is the consummation de-
voutly to be wished .... 96
... Directing state officials to achieve specific results should suffice; how
they achieve those results must be left to them unless and until it can be
demonstrated judicial intervention is necessary.
... The effect of [some of] these remedial measures does not appear to us
sufficient to warrant their economic costs, their intrusion on state decisionmaking,
or the supervisory burden that their administration would impose on a federal
court.
Id. at 1148. Just as in Gary W. and Holland, Judge Rubin put mechanisms in place to
make sure the court's orders would be enforced. For example, even though he adopted
a "wait and see" attitude as to certain relief the district court ordered, he also expressly
provided that one year after the panel's order became effective, the parties could move
for a hearing to revisit the question of what adjustments in the decree were needed to
meet the requirements of the Constitution. Id. at 1149.
94. See id. at 1164 (listing provisions of decree that were affirmed by the panel).
95. Although this opinion is too extensive to review, in detail all the changes the
panel ordered, one example will suffice for the purposes of this article. Judge Rubin's
opinion for the panel vacated the requirement that the TDC provide inmates with hospital
facilities meeting the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
Judge Rubin pointed out that many hospitals in the country do not meet these standards:
"Literally millions of persons receiving private medical care are being treated in hospitals
that do not meet the requirements imposed by the district court's decree." Id. at 1150.
For inmates, the Supreme Court had determined that the Constitution "prohibits only
'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."' Id. at 1149 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976)). Judge Rubin ordered the district court to
limit relief to requiring the TDC to "provide the minimum level of hospital care required
by the Constitution." Id. at 1150.
96. Id. at 1163. For discussion of the implementation of the Ruiz decree, see Ben
19921 1519
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Here again in Ruiz, it is quite clear what Judge Rubin thought society
should regard as a good and what it should regard as an evil. Although
throughout Ruiz he showed respect for the values of state autonomy
and judicial reluctance to become involved in institutional administration,
Judge Rubin also made clear that we should not permit those abstractions
to allow us to tolerate unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
F. Taking Responsibility for Choice
Professor Tribe's sixth sin-abdicating responsibility for choice-
refers to the "comforting illusion of inexorability" 97 that comes from
putting too much faith in technical expertise, cost-benefit analysis, or
any other "fundamental faith" of judging. 98 Professor Tribe illustrated
this sin in bi-partisan fashion by examining abortion decisions from the
left and right of the political spectrum.9
Within the limitations of the specific task I have taken on at the
behest of the organizers of this special law review issue, I found it
difficult to find pristine examples of Judge Rubin taking responsibility
for choices he made. There are, however, strong hints that can be
derived from several opinions.
For example, in Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,'00 Judge Rubin
had to decide whether a white female married to an Iranian national
could state a claim for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
on the basis that her husband was considered to be a member of a
race other than white. Reversing the district court on this point, Judge
Rubin decided that she could make such a claim, even though
"[a]nthropologists classify Iranians as Caucasians."' 0'° Rather than hide
behind the experts, he felt that such a "taxonomical definition of race"
M. Crouch & James W. Marquart, An Appeal to Justice: Litigated Reform of Texas
Prisons (1989); Sheldon Elkand-Olson & Steve J. Martin, Ruiz: A Struggle Over Legitimacy
in Courts, Corrections and the Constitution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on
Prisons and Jails (John J. DiIulio ed. 1990).
97. Tribe, supra note 1, at 168.
98. Id.
99. He showed that the Court had abdicated its role as decisionmaker to technical
medical expertise in its liberal decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705
(1973). Professor Tribe criticized the Court's reliance on medical science for the "tri-
mesterization of pregnancy" standards, rather than more forthrightly making it clear that
the Court was choosing "to empower women in society by putting them on a more equal
footing with men." Tribe, supra note 1, at 168-69. He then criticized the Court for
abdicating responsibility in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980), where
it held that it was permissible for the federal government to withhold public funding
from poor women who wanted to have abortions. Tribe, supra note 1, at 169-70.
100. 802 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1986).
101. Id. at 114-15.
1520 [Vol. 52
IN MEMORIAM: AL VIN B. RUBIN
was inconsistent with the statutory rationale and the Supreme Court's
precedent. 0 2
There are also examples in cases that we have already examined.
In Gary W. v. Louisiana, Judge Rubin refused to bow to the technical
expertise of the plaintiff's witnesses in deciding how the state had to
treat the children entrusted to its care. 03 The jail and prison cases
certainly reject the idea that the technical expertise of the jailers deserved
complete deference.
A final example serves to make the same point in a different context.
In Hill v. Mississippi State Employment Service,1°4 a black woman who
sought job referrals from the defendant alleged racial discrimination.
The trial court found in favor of the defendant; the panel majority
affirmed on the basis that it was not clearly erroneous for the court
below to find that the plaintiff had failed to prove discrimination under
either the disparate treatment or disparate analysis standards. 05 The
majority believed that it was forced to accept the defendant's excuse
that "general inefficiency" was the reason for the apparent discrimi-
nation against the plaintiff.1'° Judge Rubin was not willing to acquiesce
in such an abdication of responsibility. In dissent, he rejected the idea
that the defendants could rebut a prima facie case of racial discrimination
by using the inefficiency of its employees in a very bureaucratic system
as a legitimate excuse:
The allegedly inefficient, regulation-hamstrung, overworked em-
ployees whom it has hired and through whom it functions are
the MSES [Mississippi State Employment Service]. It may not
wash its hands of the spots ... by which their actions have
stained the MSES. Indeed were its employees merely inefficient,
their actions would not have resulted in racial discrimination,
102. Id. at 115.
103. [Jiust as "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics," it does not codify current psychological theories con-
cerning child development or the treatment of the retarded ...
... Even though the constitution's precepts are evolutionary, it is after all
a constitution, and not a textbook that can be revised periodically.
Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1218-19 (E.D. La. 1976) (quoting Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75, 25 S. Ct. 539, 546 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
104. 918 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 188 (1991).
105. Id. at 1234.
106. If in truth an agency's or employer's verified, detailed and documented
inefficiency, absent any discriminatory animus, accounts for results that none-
theless appear at first glance to be the product of discrimination, it would be
the height of unfairness to infer fallaciously such a discriminatory animus. We
do not mean to condone inefficiency; we simply cannot punish it under Title
VII.
Id. at 1239-40.
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for inefficiency would function as much to hamper white as
minority applicants in seeking jobs. 0 7
Judge Rubin was not willing to abdicate responsibility for his decision
by allowing the defendants to hide behind such a pretext-here, technical
inexpertise.'0
To be fair, there are other cases I could review that would show
Judge Rubin reaching decisions that he might not agree with privately
because he felt bound by precedent and the rules of judging, especially
appellate judging.'09 There are any number of examples of cases where
he denied civil rights claims despite some uncomfortable facts, because
he felt bound by the law." 0 Is this abdicating responsibility for choice?
I do not think so. To a great degree, this is a key element of
judging. One who takes the oath of office as a judge in the United
States court system must adhere to certain understandings that make
our version of the common law system operate-the need to accept
legislative and executive superiority in their appropriate realms, the dual
sovereignty inherent in our federal system, the role of precedent and
the need for predictability, the hierarchy of courts (including rules that
do not permit one panel of the circuit to overrule the holding of another),
and the application of valid procedural rules, such as the clearly er-
roneous rule. Undoubtedly, there is a point where adhering to role
becomes an inappropriate abdication of responsibility,"' but one must
strive to stay within the role in order for the system to function."2
107. Id. at 1241 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
108. See id. at 1244 ("The need for efficiency constitutes a defense in disparate-
treatment cases. It would be ironic if the employer's claim of its own inefficiency also
served as a defense.") (Rubin, J., dissenting).
109. See, e.g., Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge's Response to the Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 37 J. Legal Educ. 307, 310-11 (1987) (appellate rules "avoid
chaos in results") [hereinafter Rubin].
110. E.g., White v. Walker, 932 F.2d 1136, opinion on reh'g, 950 F.2d 972 (5th Cir.
1991) (no cause of action under Mississippi law where teenager committed suicide less
than one hour after being taken improperly into police custody); Fulford v. King, 692
F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1982) (prison policy requiring certain prisoners to wear a device over
their handcuffs on trips outside the prison did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
even when device caused numbness and temporary marks).
11. The judge whose decisions are entirely predictable is one who is not
influenced by changing events, by reading briefs, by considering the arguments
on both sides of a dispute, by thinking carefully about an issue with the
knowledge that real people will be affected by his decision, or by the craftsman's
need to explain that decision.
Rubin, supra note 109, at 314.
112. Judge Rubin described the balance as follows:
Judges' decisions should be reasonably consistent and coherent. When pre-
cedents and prior doctrine are disregarded or discarded, judges should be able
to explain the reasons for doing so. Some of the explanation may lie in a
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G. Avoiding Judicial Imperialism
I believe Professor Tribe would agree that it is vital to adhere to
the rules of judging, even where that involves deferring to the power
of other actors. But there are limits. Professor Tribe made his final sin
one that went hand-in-hand with abdication of responsibility for choice-
the sin of judicial imperialism masquerading as modesty or strict con-
struction."3 Speaking in 1984, Professor Tribe pointed out that the
Supreme Court had become highly imperial. 4 "Unhinged from the
discipline of conceding that it is making constitutional choices, the Court
readily seizes power and says that it is just carrying out one neutral
method or another."" 5
Even though Judge Rubin might have had something of a reputation
as a liberal "activist judge,""' 6 many of his opinions, in addition to
ones already discussed here, make it unmistakable that Judge Rubin
was not a judicial imperialist. For example, in Jones v. HUD, 117 the
plaintiffs were the residents of an apartment house that was scheduled
for demolition. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' phase-out of
the low-income housing project was motivated by racial discrimination.
After describing the apartments as displaying "the classic signs of urban
decay in its most acute form,""' Judge Rubin, sitting on the district
court, felt compelled to point out:
But the fact that these apartments are not suitable places for
people to live does not mean that a federal court has authority
conflicting body of doctrine. Some may be found in social or economic policy.
The cases in which this is done may be the great cases, the textbook cases for
the next edition of "Cases and Materials." In any court over any term there
are few. The rest, the cases society lives by almost all of the time, are decided
by doctrine. Most of that doctrine comes directly or indirectly from legislation
or from the legislature's inaction. And in a democratic society that is the way
it should be. If it were not, then a government by law would be impossible.
Rubin, supra note 109, at 314. In this article on the role of legal doctrine, Judge Rubin
did suggest, but did not address, that there is a limit to following the rules, to avoid
abdicating responsibility. See id. at 308 ("What judges should or can do .. . when
following law leads to what they consider a miscarriage of justice is a serious topic .....
113. Tribe, supra note 1, at 170.
114. His examples included Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976), striking
down. Congress' attempt to limit how the rich can dominate the political process, and
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), declaring more acts of Congress
unconstitutional in one opinion than the Court had done in its entire history. See Tribe,
supra note 1, at 170-71. There are certainly examples that we could find from today's
Court as well. E.g., supra note 4.
115. Tribe, supra note 1, at 171 (emphasis in original).
116. E.g., text accompanying notes 81-86.
117. 390 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. La. 1974).
118. Id. at 584.
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to make them habitable or to order someone else to do so.
Federal judges have no blanket authority to right all wrongs
and remedy every injustice, however troubled by them they may
be. The same Constitution that protects the rights of the people
limits the jurisdiction and the authority of federal judges.
... To succeed, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants
have in some fashion violated federal law and that, under the
tests the law directs the court to apply, they are entitled to
[relief] 19
These same notions of the judicial role clearly stayed with Judge
Rubin throughout his career. We can see this by reviewing one of his
very last opinions, Christopher M. v. Corpus Christi Independent School
District. 20 The eleven-year-old plaintiff was a profoundly handicapped
child with an IQ of five and the functional development of an infant.
When the authorities at the school he attended proposed reducing his
school day from four to two hours, he sought, through his grandmother,
to have his school day returned to a full seven hours per day.' The
administrative hearing officer and the district court both found that
Christopher's school day should remain at four hours.12 In affirming,
Judge Rubin had to balance what I am sure were his sympathies for
the plight of the child and the child's grandmother, against the commands
of the statute for an individually tailored education.121
The opinion weaves together authority drawn from the federal stat-
ute, state law, Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent, opinions of
other circuits, and factual findings (including credibility choices) made
by the district court. Although generally deferring to these authorities,
Judge Rubin did decide that the appellate court should subject to de
novo review, as a mixed question of law and fact, the district court's
conclusion that the individualized education plan of a particular child
fulfills the needs of his or her appropriate education.2 4 Thus, while
avoiding judicial imperialism, he also did not abdicate responsibility for
making the hard choice that was at the crux of the case.
Unlike many of the opinions I have highlighted here, Christopher
M. has no overt explanation of judicial role and function. There is no
119. Id.
120. 933 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1991). The opinion was released posthumously.
121. The plaintiff relied upon the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), which
provides for a "free appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (I) (1990).
122. Christopher M., 933 F.2d at 1288.
123. E.g., id. at 1289 ("EHA does not require that the State attempt to maximize
each child's potential"; state only required to permit the child to benefit educationally
in a meaningful way).
124. Id. at 1289.
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one ringing statement in it that could serve as a fitting epitaph, but I
trust I have done my part elsewhere. 25 But, ultimately I think Christopher
M. is a fitting opinion upon which to conclude, for it is an example
of what Judge Rubin did repeatedly in his judicial career. He gave the
parties a sympathetic hearing and made sure the plaintiff received eve-
rything he was entitled to under the law (and no more). He wrote an
opinion which made clear the basis for every conclusion and delineated
the rightful authority of appropriate actors in the proceeding-Congress,
the school authorities, the hearing officer, the district court judge, and
the appellate court. As a society, we could hardly ask for more from
our judges.
III. CONCLUSION
As I indicated he would at the beginning, Judge Rubin passes my
Tribe-derived test with flying colors. His civil rights opinions demonstrate
adherence to the Seven Virtues of Judging: Valuing Process, Heeding
the Effects of the Distribution of Power and Wealth, Avoiding Fixation
on the Tangible, Avoiding the Tyranny of Small Decisions, Incorporating
the Constitutive Dimension of Governmental Action, Taking Respon-
sibility for Choice, and Avoiding Judicial Imperialism. Professor Tribe
ended the lecture I heard by suggesting two possible reactions to the
specter of a Supreme Court committing the Seven Deadly Sins. We
could "retreat to cynicism, accepting for the rest of our lives the
inevitability of a moral vacuum ... even in our nation's court of last
resort." 2 6 Or "[wle can ... keep the faith, and keep arguing with
passion for the . .. choices in which we believe and of which we dare
to think we can convince others.'2
Judge Rubin clearly made his choice: his civil rights opinions show
us how to keep the faith, even while he adhered to the jurisprudential
constraints imposed on federal judges in our system. If we remember
and follow his example, we can be proud of the kinds of people, the
kind of society we will be.
125. Also, I have in mind an incident from the annals of clerking for Judge Rubin
that gives me pause before ending on too effusive a note. One day in 1979, he gave me
one of those "wild goose chase" assignments every clerk enjoys. I ultimately located the
article Judge Rubin wanted, Note, Crossing the Bar, 78 Yale L.J. 484 (1969), which is
a deft review of judicial eulogies. Because Judge Rubin liked the article so much that he
wanted to write a fan letter to the author, I had to persuade the Yale Law Journal to
break the secret code revealing the name of the student who had written the decade-old
Note, and then I had to find a current address for this person. Go read the Note and
know you are sharing a laugh with Judge Rubin.
126. Tribe, supra note 1, at 172.
127. Id.
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